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Note
How New Zealand’s Adoption of the Nagoya
Protocol Would Enhance Protection of Māori
Traditional Knowledge
Emily Ortlieb Ricciardi
“Te manu e kei i te miro, nōna te ngahere, Te manu e kai
i te mātauranga, nōna te ao.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Mānuka, or tea tree, is known to have antibacterial,
antifungal, and antihistamine properties, and is used to treat a
variety of ailments.2 It is also one of New Zealand’s most
common native trees, and its medicinal properties were first
discovered and applied by Māori, the indigenous people of New
Zealand.3 Over the last several decades, mānuka has been the
subject of extensive research, providing the basis for a multimillion dollar commercial industry.4 New Zealand and the
United States have both granted multiple patents for mānukarelated products and processes, all of which have one thing in
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1. Māori proverb meaning “[t]he bird that partakes of the miro berry, owns
the forest; the bird that partakes of education, owns the world.” MINISTRY
EDUC., EARLY CHILDHOOD CURRICULUM 13 (2017), https://tewhariki.tki.org.nz/
assets/Uploads/Te-Whariki-Whakatauki.pdf.
2. WAITANGI TRIBUNAL, 1 KO AOTEAROA TENEI: A REPORT INTO CLAIMS
CONCERNING NEW ZEALAND LAW AND POLITY AFFECTING MĀORI CULTURE AND
IDENTITY
129
(2011)
[hereinafter
WAI
262
REPORT],
https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/WT/wt_DOC_68356416/KoAote
aroaTeneiTT2Vol1W.pdf.
3. Id. at 130.
4. Id.
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common: utter exclusion of even a mention of the foundational
Māori traditional knowledge.5
Māori, like many indigenous and tribal peoples throughout
the world, have developed a vast wealth of traditional
knowledge, which they rightfully wish to protect and promote.6
Few indigenous peoples use the intellectual property legal
system to do so, as it does not provide adequate solutions to
challenges typically faced by indigenous peoples regarding
traditional knowledge.7 However, certain legal mechanisms
exist—both within New Zealand and internationally—capable of
bridging the divide between the western intellectual property
system and Māori understanding of ownership.
The Waitangi Tribunal, a permanent commission of review
established by the Crown of New Zealand, oversees claims
brought by Māori relating to Crown actions of breach of the
centuries-old Treaty of Waitangi.8 The Nagoya Protocol,
supplemental to the Convention on Biological Diversity, and not
yet ratified by New Zealand, provides a transparent legal
framework for fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out
of genetic resources.9 By ratifying and implementing the Nagoya
Protocol, New Zealand could provide an optimal system of
traditional knowledge protection sensitive to indigenous ways of
thinking by utilizing Waitangi Tribunal Recommendations and
the Nagoya Protocol in tandem.
Part I of this note introduces Māori and existing legal
mechanisms governing indigenous traditional knowledge. Part
II proposes the ratification of the Nagoya Protocol as a
complementary mechanism to the recommendations made by
the Waitangi Tribunal in the Ko Aotearoa Tenei (Wai 262
Report). It will analyze the issues arising in the application of a
Western intellectual property regime to indigenous traditional
knowledge, the methods by which New Zealand and Māori are
working together to incorporate traditional knowledge into state
5. See id. at 130–31.
6. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., PROTECT AND PROMOTE YOUR
CULTURE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 3 (2017).
7. Id.
8. WAITANGI TRIBUNAL, https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/ (last
visited Jan. 12, 2019).
9. See Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 (Oct. 29, 2010).
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intellectual property protection mechanisms, and benefit
sharing under the Nagoya Protocol as an alternative way to
respect indigenous traditional knowledge rights.
II. BACKGROUND
A. MĀORI PEOPLE OF NEW ZEALAND
Māori, indigenous to New Zealand, are said to have arrived
in Aotearoa, or the “land of the long white cloud,” in the
fourteenth century.10 Each tribe, or iwi, acknowledges a common
ancestry as well as a particular social order.11 Much of Māori
culture originated in East Polynesian traditions, which
developed further during several centuries of isolation to include
vibrant horticultural innovations and later a warrior culture.12
Māori are unique in that they recognize “cognatic or bilateral
descent groups” known as guardians that control or own certain
resources, including land.13
Māori currently make up approximately 15% of the New
Zealand Population.14 The socioeconomic gap between Māori and
non-Māori is significant; the difference in life expectancy is
about eight years, household income of Māori is 78% of the
national average, and Māori make up over 50% of the prison
population.15 Since the arrival of British colonists in New
10. Māori nations have and continue to refer to New Zealand as Aotearoa,
MAORI.COM,
or
“land
of
the
long
white
cloud.”
Aotearoa,
https://www.maori.com/aotearoa (last visited Dec. 6, 2018); see also Māori,
Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/maori (last visited
Dec. 6, 2018).
11. Māori, supra note 10.
12. Id.; Maori, INTERCONTINENTAL CRY https://intercontinentalcry.org/
indigenous-peoples/maori/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2018); see also AIG, Haka—
History, YOUTUBE (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AnlFoca
A64M.
13. Victor T. King, Cognatic Society, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 106, 107 (Alan Barnard & Jonathan Spencer eds.,
1996).
14. See 2013 Census Ethnic Group Profiles: Māori , STATS NZ, http://
archive.stats.govt.nz/census/2013-census/profile-and-summary-reports/ethnicprofiles.aspx?request_value=24705&parent_id=24704&tabname=#24705 (last
visited Dec. 6, 2018) (“Māori comprised 598,602 people or 14.9 percent of people
that stated an ethnic group living in New Zealand on 5 March 2013.”).
15. INT’L WORK GRP. FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, THE INDIGENOUS WORLD
2017, 283 (Katrine Broch Hansen et al. eds., Apr. 2017),
https://www.iwgia.org/images/documents/indigenous-world/indigenous-world2017.pdf.
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Zealand in the mid-1700s, Māori have been plagued by a long
history of inequality and discrimination.
1. Overview of Māori Key Cultural Language
iwi: individual tribe within Māori
kaitiaki: a guardian entrusted to nurture and care for a
person or aspect(s) of the environment, such as the sky, sea, or
land.16
mātauranga Māori: Māori traditional knowledge, the way
in which Māori view themselves and the world.17
taonga: anything that is treasured, tangible or intangible,
including land, waters, wildlife, identity, and culture.18
2. The Treaty of Waitangi and Waitangi Tribunal
The Treaty of Waitangi, often referred to as the nation’s
founding agreement, is an agreement made between Māori and
the British Crown in 1840.19 Though available in both English
and Māori at the time of signing, the Treaty contained
overwhelmingly technical English terms, which lacked Māori
translation.20 It is not uncommon for an indigenous community
to have less developed conceptual capabilities within its
language, as was the case with the Treaty of Waitangi.21 This
meant that the two parties stood on unequal ground, as Māori
were additionally unaware of the full meaning of treaty
agreement practices within British law and culture.22
The Treaty provided that the British were granted a right of
governance, with Māori retaining sovereignty of their lands and
16. Barbara Sullivan & Lynell Tuffery-Huria, New Zealand: Wai 262
Report and After, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 403, 404 (2014).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. The Treaty in Brief, N.Z. HIST., https://nzhistory.govt.nz/
politics/treaty/the-treaty-in-brief (last updated May 17, 2017). The treaty was
signed by representatives of the British Crown and over 500 Māori chiefs. See
Sue Scheeles, Safeguarding Indigenous Knowledge and Access to Plant
Resources Through Partnership: A New Zealand Perspective, 4 INT’L J. RURAL
L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2015).
20. Tim Stirrup, Bioprospecting, the Nagoya Protocol and Indigenous
Rights; A New Zealand Perspective, 107 J. INTELL. & INDUS. PROP. SOC’Y AUSTL.
& N.Z. 53, 58 (2016).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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resources.23 Māori were also granted the same rights as British
citizens; although subsequent New Zealand governments
ignored the Treaty for many years following the signing.24 Today
the treaty has limited legal status and therefore “Māori rights
are largely dependent on political will and ad hoc recognition of
the treaty.”25
Constant dispute over the operation and text of the Treaty
of Waitangi led to the creation of the Waitangi Tribunal, which
was established by the Treaty of Waitangi Act in 1975.26 The
Tribunal’s main purpose is to determine the meaning of the
Treaty, which involves investigation of Māori claims of breach of
the Treaty.27 However, the Tribunal has no authoritative power
other than to issue recommendations for remedy.28 Regardless,
it has been hailed a “mammoth and ongoing public historymaking project.”29 Since 1975, the Tribunal has issued upwards
of ninety reports in response to hundreds of both historical and
contemporary claims filed before it.30
The Waitangi Tribunal retains up to twenty members, each
appointed by the Governor-General following recommendation
by the Minister for Māori Development.31 Typically, half are
Māori and half are Pākehā, New Zealanders of European
descent.32 Membership is diverse, and members are appointed
based on expertise in a given area that is likely to come before
the Tribunal.33 Panels of up to seven members are appointed to
carry out inquiries of the claims made before it; each panel must
include at least one Māori member.34
In 2014, the Tribunal announced a “Strategic Direction”

23. Id.
24. Susan Corbett, Governance Systems for Access to and Use of Indigenous
Knowledge and Culture: A New Zealand Perspective (Mar. 7, 2017), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3015026.
25. Stirrup, supra note 20, at 58.
26. Id. at 61.
27. Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, pmbl. (N.Z.).
28. Id. art. 3; Stirrup, supra note 20, at 61.
29. Rachel Buchanan, Decolonizing the Archives: The Work of New
Zealand’s Waitangi Tribunal, 14 PUB. HIST. REV. 44, 45 (2007).
30. Id.
31. About the Waitangi Tribunal, WAITANGI TRIB., https://www.waitangi
tribunal.govt.nz/about-waitangi-tribunal/members-of-the-waitangi-tribunal/
(last updated Nov. 1, 2018).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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plan to be implemented between 2014 and 2025.35 The plan
acknowledges that unresolved past Treaty grievances present a
major obstacle to restoring and sustaining the relationship
between Māori and the Crown as defined by the Treaty.36 These
historical claims relate to issues faced by indigenous peoples
globally: colonization, loss of land, and economic and social
marginalization.37 Historical claims are separate from
contemporary claims which cover the last twenty years, and
thematic claims, which are general grievances that affect Māori
statewide.38 The Tribunal aspires to address all historical claims
by 2020, followed by completion of thematic ones.39 The overall
goal is to reduce the backlog completely by 2025, giving the
Tribunal the ability to hear claims as they are filed.
3. Wai 262 and Ko Aotearoa Tēnei: A Report into Claims
Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy Affecting Māori
Culture and Identity
Wai 262 is a collection of claims filed in 1991 by individuals
from six separate Māori nations who were alarmed by the
exploitation of their traditional knowledge and the
misappropriation of “[i]ndigenous flora and fauna.”40 The claim
was amended in 1997 in light of proposed intellectual property
and free trade legislation.41 The claimants also sought a specific
definition of the term taonga, traditionally and broadly
understood to mean “treasure,” to include all parts of a tribe’s
collective estate, “material and non-material, tangible and
intangible.” Probably the most sweeping claim brought before
the Tribunal, Wai 262, is, at its core, a claim about mātauranga
Māori: “the unique Māori way of viewing the world,
incorporating both Māori culture and Māori traditional

35. WAITANGI TRIBUNAL, WAITANGI TRIBUNAL STRATEGIC DIRECTION
2014–2025 (2014), https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/assets/Documents/
Publications/WT-Strategic-direction-2014-to-2025.pdf.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id. at 8.
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id.
40. Fleur Adcock, Diluted Control: A Critical Analysis of the Wai 262 Report
on Māori Traditional Knowledge and Culture, in INDIGENOUS INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 497–516 (Matthew
Rimmer ed., 2015).
41. Id.
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knowledge.”42 Like many legal issues, the actual claim is
confounded by disputed meaning of certain words.43 In this case,
it is further complicated by translations in Māori and English.44
Most of the Wai 262 centers on the meaning of taonga in
Article 2 of the Treaty. Both the Tribunal and New Zealand
courts have determined taonga to include treasures of both
tangible and intangible nature.45 However, the Wai 262
claimants insist that it includes other elements central to their
culture and identity, including traditional cultural expressions
as well as indigenous flora and fauna.46 The Tribunal ultimately
found that New Zealand intellectual property law did not
provide adequate protection to Māori taonga, as understood by
Māori people.47 It then made a series of recommendations for
intellectual property reform capable of functioning within
existing intellectual property law.48
The findings were released in a report in 2011, which
considers a wide variety of Māori interests including intellectual
and cultural property, protection of language, traditional Māori
healing, and the impact on Māori people of international
commitments made by the Crown.49 At more than one thousand
pages and twenty years of hard work, the Report is significant
both for New Zealand’s and the international intellectual
property systems.50 The claim centers on a New Zealand treaty
and its attempt to determine “what indigenous peoples’ control
over their traditional knowledge should look like in
contemporary times . . . .”51 The Report has received mixed
reviews; some see it as giving too much control to Māori, and
some as failing to offer Māori any meaningful control. Still some
see it as striking an adequate balance between the two.52
The Tribunal noted in the Report the tension between
tradition in Western practice to attribute value by property
rights and Māori practice to attribute value in terms of kinship

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
Adcock, supra note 40, at 500.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 506.
Id.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 498.
Id.
Id.

288

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 28:1

and obligations to the collective.53 The Tribunal observes that
the principles of kaitiakitanga (guardianship) and property
rights are simply two different ways to conceptualize the same
issue: “the ways in which two cultures decide the rights and
obligations of communities in their created works and valued
resources.”54
At the heart of the Wai 262 claim is mātauranga Māori, or
Māori knowledge, which is connected to the term taonga.55 The
Waitangi Tribunal provides a working definition of a taonga
work as “a work, whether or not it has been fixed, that is in its
entirety an expression of mātauranga Māori; it will relate to or
invoke ancestral connections, and contain or reflect traditional
narratives or stories.”56 Taonga works can be ancient or modern,
and function as representations of ancestors.57 As such, Māori
kaitiaki, or guardians, are entrusted with the responsibility to
protect the physical wellbeing of taonga, including taonga
species, or flora and fauna both native and nonnative to New
Zealand that carry stories related to Māori ancestors.58
In terms of intellectual property, Wai 262 is rooted in a
twofold objection: first, in the inappropriate exploitation of
Māori traditional knowledge by non-Māori, and second, in the
inability of Māori to control their traditional knowledge
themselves.59 Another major claim voiced within Wai 262 is the
failure of New Zealand’s intellectual property laws to protect the
mātauranga Māori (Māori traditional knowledge) as a taonga,
or cultural treasure, which is guaranteed under Article 2 of the
Treaty of Waitangi.60 The six iwi who brought the claim declared
that New Zealand’s intellectual property laws neither actively
prevent third parties from exploiting mātauranga Māori, nor
permit Māori to reap the benefits of their traditional knowledge
should they choose to do so.61 Against the backdrop of the
53. Sullivan & Tuffery-Huria, supra note 16, at 404.
54. WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 33.
55. Id. at 96.
56. Id.
57. Adcock, supra note 40, at 502.
58. Id.
59. Seamus Woods, Patents, PVRs and Pragmatism: Giving Effect to the
WAI 262, 19 CANTERBURY L. REV. 97, 97 (2013).
60. See Essence of the Wai 262 Claim, WAI 262, https://wai262.weebly.com/
essence-of-the-claim.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2018); cf. Oliver Sutherland et al.,
The Background to WAI 262, 8, WAI 262, https://wai262.weebly.com/
uploads/7/4/6/3/7463762/history_wai_262.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2018).
61. Woods, supra note 59, at 99.
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irreconcilable guardianship spirit and Western intellectual
property regime, the Waitangi Tribunal released its
recommendations in the Report titled Ko Aotearoa Tēnei (“[t]his
is New Zealand”) in July 2011.62
B. BIOCOLONIALISM AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
The Indigenous Peoples Council on Biocolonialism defines
biocolonialsim as an extension of the “reach of the colonial
process into the biomes and knowledge systems of indigenous
peoples in the search for marketable genetic resources and
traditional knowledge.”63 Some have considered cultural and
intellectual property rights to be a second wave of colonization,
as the principles of Western intellectual property are seen as an
extension of foreign conquest and dominance.64 Indigenous
scholars have associated the biocolonial process with “control,
manipulation and ownership of life itself, and the ancient
knowledge systems held by indigenous peoples.”65 Indigenous
peoples then, as the original innovators, owners, and stewards
of much of the world’s biodiversity, find themselves at the center
of this problem.66 Rather than consolidating the concept of
ownership, some indigenous peoples view their heritage and
culture as a whole in terms of community and individual
responsibility.67 Specific to Māori traditions, knowledge is
shared and passed down to successive generations according to
Māori customary law.68 Generally speaking, even individual
roles to care for a particular person or natural resource are
undertaken on behalf of the community as a whole, emphasizing
the idea of collective ownership.69
Another scholar has said that “[i]f colonialism encompasses
the interlocking array of policies and practices (economic, social,
62. WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at xxiii (defining “Ko Aotearoa Tēnei”);
Woods, supra note 59, at 101 (“The Government, which is not bound by the
Tribunal’s proposals, reacted by giving assurances that it will consider the
recommendations over time, but that it was in ‘no rush’ to respond . . . .”).
63. Debra Harry, Biocolonialism and Indigenous Knowledge in United
Nations Discourse, 20 GRIFFITH L. REV. 702, 702 (2011).
64. JESSICA CHRISTINE LAI, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 60 (2014).
65. Harry, supra note 63, at 703.
66. Id. at 704.
67. LAI, supra note 64, at 60.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 61.
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political, and legal) that a dominant culture draws on to
maintain and extend its control over other peoples and lands,
biocolonialsim emphasizes the role of science policy and of
scientific practice within that array.”70 Extractive biocolonialism
is the process by which biological “resources and information
about them are sought, ‘discovered,’ and ‘removed to the
microworlds of biotechnoscience.’”71 These resources and
information are “legally christened” as the intellectual property
of an individual, corporation, or institution, and then further
exploited by placement in a state or global market as a
commodity.72
The highly controversial issue of whether traditional
knowledge should or can be governed by a Western intellectual
property regime is the same issue presented before the Tribunal
in the Wai 262 claim.73 Perhaps the largest Māori concern is that
reducing this aspect of their culture to Māori “traditional
knowledge” or Māori “intellectual property” overgeneralizes and
misrepresents the multifaceted spiritual connection between the
traditional knowledge and their culture and way of life as a
whole.74 This is not a struggle that is unique to Māori people;
many peoples, particularly across the global south, are equally
fraught.75 The Western world generally highlights both
commodification and individual ownership. Intellectual property
rights are seen as a means of incentivizing innovation by
allowing an inventor or breeder to temporarily benefit from her
invention.76 Conversely, indigenous peoples including Māori see
themselves in a guardianship role over tangible and intangible
resources alike.77 Thus, emphasis is placed on an unending
spiritual oneness with nature.78 Relatedly, the Waitangi
Tribunal in its 2011 report on the Wai 262 claim found that
“while Māori have no proprietary rights in taonga species, the
cultural relationships between kaitiaki and taonga species are
70. Laurie Anne Whitt, Indigenous Peoples, Intellectual Property & the New
Imperial Science, 23 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 211, 212 (1998).
71. Id. at 213.
72. Id.
73. Woods, supra note 59, at 97.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., WIPO ACADEMY, CASE STUDY: HOODIA PLANT (Jan. 2008),
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/academy/en/about/global_network/educa
tional_materials/cs1_hoodia.pdf.
76. Woods, supra note 59, at 100.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 101.
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entitled to reasonable protection.”79
It is not difficult to see why Māori’s guardianship
relationship with the mātauranga Māori is inadequately served
by a restrictive Western intellectual property system.80 The idea
of owning or exploiting the mātauranga, regardless of who is
doing the owning or exploiting, is a foreign and exceptional
concept.81 Further, neither intellectual property law nor
equivalent terms exist within Māori culture or language.82 UN
experts have held the position that the Western intellectual
property system is “inherently unsuitable” for the protection of
indigenous intellectual property, in that “[s]ubjecting indigenous
peoples to such a legal scheme would have the same effect on
their identities, as the individualization of land ownership, in
many countries, has had on their territories—that is,
fragmentation into pieces, and the sale of the pieces, until
nothing remains.”83
One scholar points out that it is impossible to compare
intellectual property and real property in this way under a
western property regime.84 In indigenous knowledge systems,
outsider use of indigenous cultural heritage can alter the
integrity of that particular aspect of the indigenous cultural
heritage, rendering it useless to that community.85
C. CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND THE
NAGOYA PROTOCOL
In the Wai 262 Report, the Waitangi Tribunal refers to the
Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”) as the “centre of
gravity” in the debate on international bioprospecting.86 The

79. WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 212.
80. See id. at 51, 209.
81. See id. at 208–11.
82. LAI, supra note 64, at 59.
83. Id. (quoting Daes, the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and Chairperson of
the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, ¶ 32 (1993)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 146; see Bioprospecting, UNDP,
http://www.undp.org/content/sdfinance/en/home/solutions/bioprospecting.html
(last visited Dec. 28, 2018) (describing bioprospecting as a process by which
biological material in nature is sought after for the purpose of developing
commercially-valuable products in areas such as pharmaceuticals and
agriculture).

292

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 28:1

CBD provides an international framework for preserving
biodiversity. In 2010 an optional protocol to the CBD was
adopted: The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and
the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their
Utilisation to the Convention on Biological Diversity (“Nagoya
Protocol”).87 The Nagoya Protocol is the product of eleven years
of steadfast effort on the part of multiple groups of people:
experts on access and benefit-sharing agreements, a range of
state representatives, UN diplomats, as well as multiple
indigenous rights groups.88 It functions as a supplementary
agreement to the Convention on Biodiversity (“CBD”), aiming to
facilitate “access to genetic resources from each sovereign state”
and to safeguard the sharing of benefits that result from
research, development and commercialization of said
resources.89 It came into force in October 2014, and has since
been ratified by seventy-four countries.90 New Zealand decided
to defer ratification until the Wai 262 claim has been officially
settled, as well as the clarification of certain ambiguities within
the Nagoya Protocol.91 Some are of the opinion that New Zealand
is also reluctant due to the paramount importance of the Treaty
of Waitangi.92 The Wai 262 Report actually contains a thorough
history of the Nagoya Protocol, but is purely informational and
does not involve a recommendation.93
The Nagoya Protocol provides a legal structure to regulate
the use of both genetic resources and traditional knowledge by
“users,” meaning third-party states, companies, or other
institutions.94 It additionally outlines accepted practices
concerning bioprospecting, in order to better reduce the potential
negative consequences to the states and indigenous communities
from which the resource originates, or the “provider.”95 The
Nagoya Protocol also addresses traditional knowledge, as it

87. See WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 150; About the Nagoya Protocol,
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, https://www.cbd.int/abs/about/ (last
visited Dec. 28, 2018).
88. Stirrup, supra note 20, at 56.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 60. New Zealand would like to see further clarity on the
application of the Protocol to various sectors, namely agriculture.
92. Scheeles, supra note 19, at 1.
93. See WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 150–52.
94. Id. at 148–51.
95. Id.
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relates to genetic resources.96 Concrete obligations of states who
are party to the Nagoya Protocol include establishing clear rules
and procedures for prior informed consent, and providing for the
issuance of a permit or equivalent if and when access is
granted.97 States must also establish certain mechanisms and
provide financial support in order to achieve the overall objective
to ensure “fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the
utilization of genetic resources . . . thereby contributing to the
conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its
component.”98
The CBD as a whole gives sovereign rights to states over
genetic resources found within their borders.99 On its face, this
was (and is) problematic for indigenous peoples, given that said
peoples are often not recognized by states as sovereign (and in
many cases, hardly recognized at all).100 Further, many
indigenous communities worldwide reject the sovereignty of the
government over their genetic resources and traditional
knowledge.101 The Nagoya Protocol remedies the sovereignty
issue, at least in theory, by recognizing that indigenous
communities may have claims to a certain genetic resource
associated with traditional knowledge.102 It also encourages the
Provider states to recognize customary laws and work with
provider communities to obtain prior informed consent “on

96. Id. Though this is a step in the right direction, the majority of the body
of traditional knowledge involving cultural heritage and other traditional
cultural expressions is left out.
97. CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 87.
98. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 9, art. 1.
99. Id. pmbl.
100. See RISHABH KUMAR DHIR, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN THE WORLD OF
WORK IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC: A STATUS REPORT 3 (2015),
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---gender/documents/
publication/wcms_438853.pdf (explaining harsh conditions indigenous people
face today); Environment, UNDESA, https://www.un.org/development/desa/
indigenouspeoples/mandated-areas1/environment.html (last visited Dec. 28,
2018).
101. Jeremy Hance, Indigenous Peoples Fight for Their Rights. Governments
and Businesses Call Them Terrorists, HUFFPOST (Sept. 7, 2018, 5:45 am),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/indigenous-people-terrorists-criminalsland-human-rights_us_5b8fab75e4b0511db3ddcdac; Indigenous People Fight
Back with #NativeLivesMatter Movement, N.Y. PUB. RADIO: TAKEAWAY (Oct.
26, 2016) https://www.wnyc.org/story/do-native-lives-matter-most-americans/;
Peter Veit, 5 Ways Indigenous Groups Are Fighting Back Against Land
Seizures, WORLD RES. INST.: BLOG (June 20, 2018), https://www.wri.org/blog/
2018/06/5-ways-indigenous-groups-are-fighting-back-against-land-seizures.
102. Id.
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mutually agreed terms for the use of the genetic resources and
traditional knowledge.103
III.

ANALYSIS

A. TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE WITHIN THE WESTERN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME
At the forefront of issues relating to indigenous traditional
knowledge is the divide between Western scientific
methodologies and intellectual property regime, and indigenous
methodologies and perceptions of traditional knowledge
sharing.104 The divide is further exacerbated by lack of
recognition and lack of available protection for the intellectual
knowledge and achievements of indigenous communities.105
Multiple indigenous scholars continue to be hindered by western
scientists and government officials who devalue or disregard
traditional knowledge as lacking in contribution to western
science.106 Indigenous writers have regarded Western
bioprospecting practices as biocolonialism.107 They argue that
the Western world is both “rooted in capitalism and practices of
maldevelopment” and “looking for new colonies to invade and
exploit for further accumulation of wealth.”108
Although interest in acknowledging traditional knowledge
in certain areas of the world has grown, it has resulted in
recognition attempts that do not align with the needs. One
example is the recent endeavors to document and preserve
indigenous knowledge in databases. On its face, this seems both
beneficial and worthwhile to indigenous and non-indigenous
103. Id.; see also Nagoya Protocol, supra note 9, art. 6, 7.
104. Corbett, supra note 25, at 3.
105. Jessica Hutchings, Is Biotechnology an Appropriate Development Path
for Māori?, in PACIFIC GENES & LIFE PATENTS: PACIFIC INDIGENOUS
EXPERIENCES & ANALYSIS OF THE COMMODIFICATION & OWNERSHIP OF LIFE 23,
28 (Aroha Te Pareake Mead & Steven Ratuva eds., 2007).
106. See generally MARGARET KOVACH, INDIGENOUS METHODOLOGIES:
CHARACTERISTICS, CONVERSATIONS, AND CONTEXTS (2009); LINDA TUHIWAI
SMITH, DECOLONIZING METHODOLOGIES: RESEARCH AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
(2d ed. 2012); Corbett, supra note 25.
107. Giovanna Di Chiro, Indigenous Peoples and Biocolonialism: Defining
the “Science of Environmental Justice” in the Century of the Gene, in
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND ENVIRONMENTALISM: THE SOCIAL JUSTICE
CHALLENGE TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 251, 252 (Ronald Sandler &
Phaedra C. Pezzullo eds., 2007).
108. Hutchings, supra note 105, at 28.
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parties; however, it can also be seen as an effort to separate
indigenous knowledge from the peoples themselves.109
The characteristic power and economic imbalances between
states and indigenous peoples, even in states like New Zealand
that formally recognize the indigenous peoples within their
borders, further aggravates this issue.110 Economic imbalances
in particular can come into play when negotiating a benefitsharing mechanism as outlined in the Nagoya Protocol.111 For
example, indigenous communities are at a disadvantage in
comparison to an international corporation seeking to patent a
pharmaceutical drug rooted in traditional knowledge. The
corporation is capable of employing a high-level legal team
concerned exclusively with the interests of the corporation.112
Imbalances aside, indigenous peoples like Māori typically come
to the table lacking understanding of western intellectual
property frameworks. In one account of Māori perspective, the
idea of benefits derived exclusively from commercial exploitation
by way of commodification and ownership is profoundly “at odds
with a guardianship ethos; indeed, in many instances affording
such treatment to Māori [traditional knowledge] will be deeply

109. Corbett, supra note 25, at 3. See generally Marie Battiste, Research
Ethics for Protecting Indigenous Knowledge and Heritage: Institutional and
Researcher Responsibilities, in ETHICAL FUTURES IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH:
DECOLONIZING THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE 111, 114 (Norman K. Denzin &
Michael D. Giardina eds., 2007); Arun Agrawal, Indigenous Knowledge and the
Politics of Classification, 54 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 287, 288–93 (2002).
110. See, e.g., Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, ¶¶ 63–64, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/24/41 (July 1, 2013).
111. See generally Dhir, supra note 100, at 3–4 (explaining that indigenous
peoples are worse than the population in general and face new threats from
globalization with the intensification of pressures on resources).
112. Historically, this is generally the pattern of any agreement governing
relations between states or corporate entities and indigenous peoples. See also
WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 128 (explaining how the indigenous peoples
are unable to exercise kaitiaki relationships that is essential to the preservation
of mātauranga Māori, even with their guaranteed right under article 2 of the
Treaty); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPs and Traditional Knowledge: Local
Communities, Local Knowledge, and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks
10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.155, 170–76 (2006) (showing how many
companies have patented products that are extracted from indigenous plants
without giving proper compensation to indigenous peoples); Marcia Ellen
DeGeer, Biopiracy: The Appropriation of Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural
Knowledge, 9 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 179, 179–82 (2003) (explaining how
biotechnological corporations have been taking from indigenous peoples and
exercising biopiracy). See generally Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 110.
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offensive to Māori culture.”113 Additionally, intellectual property
laws at both the international and domestic level do not
recognize the traditional collective ownership and typically
require some sort of novelty or originality in order for knowledge
to merit protection.114
However, the Nagoya Protocol is extraordinary in that it
focuses on the fundamentals of prior and informed consent and
fair and equitable benefit sharing.115 Though perhaps
paradoxical, some indigenous communities who balk at the idea
of commercial exploitation via ownership have hailed the
Nagoya Protocol as an important step in the right direction, as
it addresses gaps in non-indigenous legal systems that
categorically deny indigenous peoples adequate legal recourse
and compensation for unapproved use of traditional knowledge
by third parties.116 This may be better viewed as a survival
mechanism; in order to remain afloat in a Western-dominated
world and avoid exploitation, it is beneficial to learn the system
and use it for the community’s benefit. The Nagoya Protocol thus
provides an important shift in international mechanisms,
whether intended or not, to begin to recognize minority systems
and ideologies.
B. BENEFIT SHARING AND THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL:
ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO RESPECT INDIGENOUS
TRADITIONAL RIGHTS
1. Actions Required by New Zealand Should it Choose to
Ratify the Nagoya Protocol
The Nagoya Protocol establishes an Access and BenefitSharing Clearing House (ABSCH), which has manifested in the
form of a database available entirely online.117 The ABSCH
profiles each state, even those not a party to the Protocol or even
the Convention on Biodiversity itself, and tracks each of the
obligations of the parties under the Protocol.118 Articles 13, 14,
17, and 29 of the Protocol provide the basis for individual state
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Woods, supra note 59, at 101.
Corbett, supra note 25, at 5.
See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 9, art. 1–4.
Corbett, supra note 25, at 5.
See Country Profiles, ABSCH: ACCESS & BENEFIT-SHARING CLEARINGHOUSE, https://absch.cbd.int/countries (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
118. Id.
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responsibilities.119
Article 13 of the Protocol requires a state to designate a
national focal point, or contact person, typically a government
agency official.120 Curiously, many states including New Zealand
who are not parties to the Nagoya Protocol have a contact listed
on the ABSCH website.121 Under Article 13, states are also
required to name competent national authorities, responsible for
regulating the concrete legal measures required by Article 14.122
Multiple state parties to the Protocol provide a variety of preexisting environmental government agencies or ministries as
their competent national authorities; others have developed new
agencies specifically named as centers on access and benefitsharing.123 In order to comply with this requirement, New
Zealand would need to construct relatively little.124 The
Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand, though primarily
Western-oriented as a trademark and patent regime, accounts
for mātauranga Māori.125 The Department of Conservation,
mentioned throughout the Wai 262 Report and included in the
recommendations, also falls within competent national
authorities parameters.126 The Waitangi Tribunal itself could
119. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 9, art. 13–14, 17, 29.
120. Id. art. 13.
121. See ABSCH: ACCESS & BENEFIT-SHARING CLEARING-HOUSE, supra
note 117.
122. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 9, art. 13.
123. See, e.g., Belarus: Competent National Authorities, ABSCH: ACCESS &
BENEFIT-SHARING CLEARING-HOUSE, https://absch.cbd.int/countries/BY (last
visited Dec. 1, 2018); Mexico: Competent National Authorities, ABSCH: ACCESS
& BENEFIT-SHARING CLEARING-HOUSE, https://absch.cbd.int/countries/MX
(last visited Dec. 1, 2018); Peru: Competent National Authorities, ABSCH:
ACCESS & BENEFIT-SHARING CLEARING-HOUSE, https://absch.cbd.int/countries/
PE (last visited Dec. 1, 2018); Syrian Arab Republic: Competent National
Authorities, ABSCH: ACCESS & BENEFIT-SHARING CLEARING-HOUSE,
https://absch.cbd.int/countries/SY (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
124. However, whether it should construct is an entirely separate matter.
The potential costs associated with setting up new administrative agencies is
likely to contribute to New Zealand’s refusal to adopt the Protocol. See Corbett,
supra note 25, at 9.
125. An entire section of the Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand is
devoted to “Māori IP.” Recognition itself is the first step; however, the
placement of mātauranga Māori within a Western intellectual property regime
still fails to account for Māori traditions such as collective ownership. See
Corbett, supra note 25, at 5 (explaining that Western intellectual property laws
do not acknowledge collective ownerships); Māori IP, N.Z. INTELL. PROP. OFF.,
https://www.iponz.govt.nz/about-ip/maori-ip/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2019).
126. See WAITANGI TRIBUNAL, 2 KO AOTEAROA TENEI: A REPORT INTO
CLAIMS CONCERNING NEW ZEALAND LAW AND POLITY AFFECTING MĀORI
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also qualify as a competent national authority.127 Together, the
national focal point and competent national authorities ideally
provide information, grant access and oversee compliance with
respect to users and providers within the state.128
Article 14 stipulates that states must make a variety of
information available to the ABSCH, including concrete
legislative, administrative, and policy policy access rights and
benefit-sharing.129 New Zealand patent law currently compels
the existence of the Patents Māori Advisory Committee
(“Patents MAC”), though the current Patents MAC does not
conform entirely to the Wai 262 Report recommendation.130 The
Patents MAC advises whether an invention claimed on a patent
application was derived from Māori traditional knowledge as
well as whether the commercial exploitation of it would be
“contrary to Māori values.”131
The Wai 262 Report also recommends a register of guardian
interests in taonga species, a legal requirement that patent
applications include disclosure of Māori traditional knowledge
used in research.132 If implemented, the register would qualify

CULTURE AND IDENTITY 491 (2011), https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/
Documents/WT/wt_DOC_68356606/KoAotearoaTeneiTT2Vol2W.pdf
(explaining that Department of Conservation, as one of the agencies that have
a role in the support, oversight, ownership and custody of mātauranga Māori,
provides administrative support for Mātauranga Kura Taiao Fund, a fund
focused on the preservation and transmission of mātauranga Māori in
biodiversity management).
127. This is especially so given that the Wai 262 Report has provided a
framework for finalizing a national access and benefit-sharing system. See
generally JORGE CABRERA MEDAGLIA ET AL., OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL AND
REGIONAL MEASURES ON ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES IN IMPLEMENTING THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL 12 (3d ed. June 25,
2014),
http://www.cisdl.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Global-Overview-ofABS-Measures_FINAL_SBSTTA18.pdf.
128. CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 87.
129. See Key Steps Towards the Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol,
CONVENTION ON BIODIVERSITY, https://www.cbd.int/abs/keysteps.shtml (last
visited Dec. 28, 2018).
130. N.Z. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY WITH A MÃORI CULTURAL ELEMENT: USER GUIDE 5–6 (2016),
https://www.iponz.govt.nz/assets/pdf/maori-ip/protecting-ip-with-a-maoricultural-element.pdf.
131. Id. at 5. When the Intellectual Property Office receives an application
for a patent, the office first decides whether the application needs to be
considered by the Patents MAC. See also Patents Act of 2013, ss 225–28 (N.Z.).
132. Cf. Patents Act of 2013, 226 (N.Z.); see also WAI 262 REPORT, supra note
2, at 202–03.
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as a concrete measure under Article 14.133 Additionally, the
Tribunal recommended that Māori be allowed input in decisions
made by the Department of Conservation regarding
bioprospecting; policy along these lines would fall within Article
14, should it be developed.134 Under Article 14, the state must
also produce copies of permits issued when a biological resource
is accessed, that are then archived in the ABSCH and used as
evidence of compliance.135
2. Unpacking New Zealand’s Reluctance to Ratify the
Nagoya Protocol
In 2015, New Zealand submitted a National Report to the
CBD serving as a mid-term assessment of its implementation.136
The review process involved addressing a set of twenty targets
under Strategic Goal A, which aim to address the underlying
causes of biodiversity loss, one of which is to be a party to and
compliant with the Nagoya Protocol.137 This report
acknowledges that New Zealand has not yet signed the Protocol
even though it is of particular interest given that New Zealand
is both a “user and provider of genetic resources.”138 The Crown
also highlights the lack of existing domestic access and benefitsharing framework, but maintains that certain legislation
provides coverage.139 The National Report then cites the Treaty
of Waitangi as justification for refusing to sign, stating that “it
is essential . . . that any domestic or international regime
maintains the Crown’s ability to fulfill its obligations under the
Treaty of Waitangi.”140
By ratifying the Nagoya Protocol, New Zealand would be
required to come to terms with the requirement that indigenous

133. CONVENTION ON BIODIVERSITY, supra note 129.
134. WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 198.
135. The permits serve as evidence that the government grants access based
on prior informed consent and mutually agreed terms. See CONVENTION ON
BIODIVERSITY, supra note 129.
136. N.Z., NEW ZEALAND’S FIFTH NATIONAL REPORT TO THE UNITED
NATIONS
CONVENTION
ON
BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY
3
(2015),
https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/nz/nz-nr-05-en.pdf.
137. Aichi Biodiversity Targets, CONVENTION ON BIODIVERSITY,
https://www.cbd.int/sp/targets/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2018).
138. N.Z., supra note 136, at 51.
139. Id. (citing the Wildlife Act of 1953 as an example).
140. Id.
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requests be formally upheld by law.141 The Crown has taken the
position that it prefers to first settle the Wai 262 claim.142 With
the importance of the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand
domestic affairs, the Crown has stressed the importance of
keeping options—in terms of domestic policy on access to
biological resources—free from limitation.143 The potential high
cost of compliance that would include bringing into force
appropriate legislation, policies, and processes for monitoring
compliance coupled with uncertainty of how best to address
these complex requirements are likely contributing factors.144
C. ASSESSING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WAI 262 REPORT
1. Wai 262: What has Been Accomplished so Far?
In the Wai 262 Report, the Tribunal ultimately found failure
on the part of the New Zealand government to fulfill its
obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi to acknowledge and
safeguard the guardian relationships between Māori and their
taonga.145 The Tribunal also stresses the importance of
partnership and shared responsibility in protecting and
conveying mātauranga Māori.146 The government of New
Zealand has yet to issue a formal response to the Report or even
a timeframe for responding, but has implemented certain
measures in response.147 The Report made several
recommendations with respect to the protection of traditional
knowledge.148 Several will be examined below in light of New
Zealand’s actions (or lack thereof) since the release of the Report
in 2011.
In terms of patents, the Tribunal recommended that an
advisory committee be formed to give input to the Commissioner
of Patents, the official who considers and grants patent rights,
on Māori interests.149 The Tribunal envisioned a committee that
would advise on issues concerning mātauranga Māori,
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Corbett, supra note 25, at 9.
Scheeles, supra note 19, at 1–2.
Id.
Corbett, supra note 25, at 9.
See Sullivan & Tuffery-Huria, supra note 16, at 403.
Id. at 407.
Id.
See generally WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2.
Id. at 169–74.
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specifically when kaitiakitanga (guardianship interests) are
involved.150 Per the recommendation, the committee would be
given (1) considerable authority to give formal advice that the
Commissioner would be obligated to consider, as well as (2) the
ability to investigate any patent or patent application as it sees
fit.151 The kaitiaki (guardians) would also have the option to
register their interests in a particular species in order to give a
patent owner fair warning of the interest, though it would not
need to be registered in order to be considered by the committee.
Additionally, patent applicants within New Zealand would be
required to disclose whether they relied on Māori traditional
knowledge.152
The Tribunal devotes a section of the Report to plant variety
rights, ultimately finding that “while Māori have no proprietary
rights in taonga species, the cultural relationship between
kaitiaki and taonga species is entitled to reasonable
protection.”153 This reasonable protection does not include the
exclusive right of the kaitiaki to breed, sell, and export taonga
species.154 The Report provides two recommendations.155 First,
any new plant variety rights legislation should include a Māori
power of refusal if the plant variety rights would affect kaitiaki
relationships with taonga species.156 Second, the Patents MAC,
the advisory committee to the Commissioner of Patents, should
also assist in crafting adequate ethical guidelines and codes of
conduct for use by those in research and development, and in the
education sector as a whole.157
New Zealand’s Patents Act 2013 provides for a Māori
advisory committee, the Patents MAC, which has considerably
more limited functions than recommended by the Wai 262
Report.158 While it is possible to assume that this new Patents
Act resulted from the Wai 262 Report, it was actually proposed
prior to the issuance of the Report and then delayed in order to
150. Id. at 99–100.
151. Id.; see also Sullivan & Tuffery-Huria, supra note 16, at 406.
152. See also Sullivan & Tuffery-Huria, supra note 16, at 406.
153. WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 212.
154. Id. at 192–95, 209–211; see also Sullivan & Tuffery-Huria, supra note
16, at 406–07.
155. Sullivan & Tuffery-Huria, supra note 16, at 407.
156. WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 212.
157. Id.
158. See generally Māori Advisory Committees, N.Z. INTELL. PROP. OFF.,
https://www.iponz.govt.nz/about-ip/maori-ip/maori-advisory-committees/ (last
visited Dec. 28, 2018); see also Sullivan & Tuffery-Huria, supra note 16, at 407.
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give the government an opportunity to consider the
recommendations made by the Tribunal in the Report.159
Developments regarding the protection of mātauranga Māori
continue to be driven predominantly by Māori, and tend to be
localized to a specific purpose or issue.160 While the New Zealand
government may provide funding or support in certain
instances, it has yet to provide any formal directives of its
own.161
The Wai 262 consolidated claim itself does not focus on
whether existing intellectual property laws are sufficient to
accommodate mātauranga Māori.162 The claim instead appears
to be driven by a desire to show that imposing a Western
intellectual property regime upon Māori is contrary to Māori
interests.163 According to some scholars, there is little
engagement with the issues that typically inform the debate
over whether legal protection of traditional knowledge—
including ideas of group ownership—can be accommodated by
intellectual property regimes such as patents and plant variety
rights.164 Instead, the Wai 262 claim is more of a demand to
repeal and reassess New Zealand intellectual property laws that
are inconsistent with Māori rights under the Treaty of
Waitangi.165 The Wai 262 Rport then addresses the claims and
issues recommendations accordingly.166
2. The Ordre Public: A Potential Issue
A recommendation for an extensive ordre public is included
in the Wai 262 Report, permitting outright denial of patents for
inventions in which the prevention of commercial exploitation of
the subject matter is necessary to protect public order or
morality, including human, animal or plant life, or to avoid
serious destruction to the environment.167 The immediate
159. Sullivan & Tuffery-Huria, supra note 16, at 409.
160. Id. at 409–10.
161. Id. at 410.
162. Graeme W. Austin, Re-Treating Intellectual Property? The Wai 262
Proceeding and the Heuristics of Intellectual Property Law, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 333, 359 (2003).
163. Id. at 360.
164. Id. at 359–60; see also Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of
Traditional Knowledge, 22 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 223, 245–46 (2001).
165. Austin, supra note 162, at 360.
166. See generally WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2.
167. The Tribunal references the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
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problem is the fact that New Zealand has no commanding
judicial or legislative guidance related to the actual meaning or
enforcement of an ordre public.168 The Wai 262 recommendation
prioritizes guardianship relationships with mātauranga Māori,
giving the Commissioner the authority to deny otherwise eligible
patents.169 While it does leave the criteria for patent applications
intact, some scholars think that it allows all parties to avoid
confronting the more difficult issues, such as informed consent
and disclosure, by acting as a catch-all.
It is possible that the ordre public could function
retroactively, causing the nullification of an existing patent
which may not be proportional to the fault of the patentholder.170 Such an issue would arise in cases where Māori guides
researchers to particular mātauranga, which is further
developed with substantial additional research into a product,
for which Māori are given no credit.171 Further complicating the
matter is the fact that the specific mātauranga may belong to
one specific Māori tribe.172 The ordre public provides for a
strictly black and white dichotomy: grant or refuse the patent
outright.173 A better option might be for the Commissioner to
allow conditions for the patent applicant to correct the situation
in order that the invention may then be patentable.174
D. RECONCILING NEW ZEALAND’S CURRENT INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SYSTEM, THE WAI 262 AND THE NAGOYA
PROTOCOL: A MĀORI-CENTERED SOLUTION
1. Wai 262 Recommendations as a Framework for New
Zealand’s Access and Benefit-Sharing Regime
In the Wai 262 Report, the Tribunal recommends the
establishment of the Māori advisory committee, which is not
particularly necessary under the Nagoya Protocol. Although the
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement developed by the World Trade
Organization. See Woods, supra note 59, at 113.
168. Id. at 121.
169. Id. at 120.
170. Id. at 121; see also Geertrui Van Overwalle, Belgium Goes its Own Way
on Biodiversity and Patents, 24 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 233, 234–35 (2002).
171. Woods, supra note 59, at 121–22.
172. Id. at 122.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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Patents MAC exists, there is currently no information or data
available to confirm that it functions in harmony with the Wai
262 Report recommendation calling for its existence. However,
the Tribunal seems to endorse the MAC as advisory (as opposed
to directive) in nature, meaning that like the Tribunal, its advice
would not be binding.175 The Tribunal also stresses the need to
balance all competing interests on a case-by-case basis with
respect to advising the Commissioner of Patents.176 Not to
mention, the MAC appears to provide more of an administrative
(as opposed to substantive) augmentation to the current
intellectual property regime.177
The Tribunal also recommends the institution of a voluntary
register of kaitiaki (guardianship) interests in mātauranga
Māori and taonga species.178 Registration would be publicly
available as well as allow potential users to easily familiarize
themselves with existing Māori interests.179 Though the
Tribunal provides that registration should not be obligatory,
such a register would also function as an administrative
supplement to New Zealand intellectual property law.180 In
theory, this system would likely cause more issues than it solves.
Some Māori may be reluctant to make their sacred relationships
available to the public, given potential to facilitate biopiracy.181
However, the Tribunal points out in the Report that a register
would be able to address the needs of guardians whose
mātauranga is already available in the public domain.182
Additionally, it would not limit or require significant change to
current New Zealand intellectual property law, and its optional
nature would protect Māori who prefer to keep their
guardianship out of the public sphere.183

175. However, this is not particularly representative of the views of Māori
lobbyists. See WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 201; Woods, supra note 59, at
113.
176. WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 195–97.
177. Woods, supra note 59, at 113.
178. WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 95.
179. LAI, supra note 64, at 253; see also Woods, supra note 59, at 116–17.
180. LAI, supra note 64, at 253–54.
181. Woods, supra note 59, at 119.
182. WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 203.
183. Id.; see also Woods, supra note 59, at 119.
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2. The Nagoya Protocol Fills the Gaps within the Waitangi
Tribunal Framework
The Wai 262 Report recommends several negative
protections allowing Māori to prevent exploitation of
mātauranga by third parties, but fails to provide for any positive
protections, such as rights that would allow guardians to develop
and protect mātauranga for their own benefit.184 This is in part
due to the concept of ownership and exclusive rights being
incompatible with Māori guardianship philosophy.185
However, the Nagoya Protocol does provide for these
positive rights by allowing for partnerships to be formed
between Māori and those seeking to use mātauranga Māori. Any
legislative or policy initiatives developed by the New Zealand
government to conform with Article 14 of the Nagoya Protocol
would likely provide some form of positive rights to Māori. The
combination of positive and negative rights thus empowers
Māori by both protecting and promoting mātauranga.
3. The Answer to Difficult Questions Involving Indigenous
Issues is More Indigenous Involvement
Professor Linda Tuhiwai Smith, a leading Māori researcher
and academic, illustrates:
The past, [indigenous] stories local and global, the
present . . . communities, cultures, languages and social
practices—all may be spaces of marginalization, but they
have also become spaces of resistance and hope. It is from
within these spaces that increasing numbers of
indigenous academics and researchers have begun to
address social issues within the wider framework of selfdetermination, decolonization and social justice.186
The few indigenous researchers who have succeeded in
academia typically have had to achieve more than their peers in
order to establish themselves.187 Not only must they survive and
do exceedingly well, but they must do so in a system that denies

184.
185.
186.
187.

Woods, supra note 59, at 125.
Id.
SMITH, supra note 106, at 4.
Id. at 223.
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the existence of traditional knowledge of their own peoples.188 It
is a fine line to walk in terms of earning credentials, “decod[ing]
and demystify[ing] the system in order to learn and be educated
without being damaged.”189 Once inside, indigenous researchers
are also tasked with making the case for the existence of
indigenous traditional knowledge as its own distinctive body of
worldly knowledge capable of contributing to modern disciplines
in addition to indigenous communities themselves.190 Even
finding journals to publish indigenous research in general, as it
relates to traditional knowledge or otherwise, also proves to be
challenge.191
Indigenous scholars and activists have fought to protect
their own systems of study and research of traditional
knowledge.192 In terms of Māori, indigenous knowledge
scholarship appears to thrive both within Māori institutions and
within a wide range of disciplines including science, health, and
Māori studies themselves.193 Conceptual work relating to the
mātauranga Māori continue to be institutionalized in student
dissertations, research programs, and Masters-level courses of
study within universities.194 As is evident in the quote at the
beginning of this section, the lengths that indigenous
communities have successfully gone to protect and nurture
traditional knowledge as a whole in the face of colonization is
inspiring.195
IV.

CONCLUSION

If applied together, the Waitangi Tribunal and Nagoya
Protocol have the capacity to provide recognition and protection
to Māori that do not currently exist under any state intellectual
property regime. Instead of forcing established indigenous
cultural ideals to abide by incompatible Western intellectual
property mechanisms, both the Waitangi Tribunal and Nagoya
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195. Id. These lengths include direct political action, protests, court actions,
land occupations, and claims to the Waitangi Tribunal. In Smith’s words,
“[t]raditional indigenous knowledge is regenerating in spaces created by
activism.”
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Protocol provide sensitivity to this issue as well as alternative
ways to protect and respect mātauranga Māori. This model could
then provide an example to other states with indigenous peoples
within their borders as a way to foster and promote rights for all.

